THE "PEACE PROCESS" TWENTY YEARS LATER
Failure Without Alternative? *

by Johan Galtung

Center of International Studies
Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey 08544

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1. The "Peace Process": Failed From The Beginning

Let me make the basic point clear from the very beginning: there is no "peace process" in the "Middle East" as the area is referred to in this country--in "West Asia" as it is referred to in, for instance, India--there has never been any peace process, and there was probably no intention of having any either.

In saying this I refer to the core conflict, in the core area, not to the subsidiary conflicts that may also be in or over the core area. I take the core area to be mandated Palestine as it emerged after World War I by the Treaty of Versailles for the administration of the former overseas possessions of Germany and parts of the Turkish Empire. According to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (paragraph 4) certain communities that had belonged to the Turkish Empire had come far towards "existence as independent nations". Examples were Palestine, Iraq and Syria. The first two were to be administered by Great Britain and the third by France, with mandates for Iraq and Syria ending in 1932 and 1936 respectively, whereas the mandate for Palestine (roughly corresponding to pre-1967 Israel and Jordan today) was to serve for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in accordance with the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. However, in accordance with Article 25 of the mandate only the territory west of Jordan was determined to serve as a national home for the Jewish people; Trans-Jordan was severed from the territory already in 1922.[1]

However, I see the core area as being mandated Palestine, both Cis- and Trans-Jordania. The core conflict is between Jews and Arabs in this area, more particularly between Israelis and Palestinians over the exercise of the type of territorial rights associated with national sovereignty. And in this core conflict I see no peace process. There is <u>no image of peace</u> even in the sense of something conceivably acceptable to both parties, <u>nor any peace process</u>. There was a process associated with the name Camp David, but that was a "peace process" imposed by Egypt and Israel (and the United States) over the Palestinians, with no Palestinians present. By that process the Palestinians were fragmented and their unity denied. The accord mentions Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza, those displaced in 1967 and refugees are three separate groups to be dealt with in three different manners -- those deported since 1967, displaced in 1948 (and later) and the Palestinians inside Israel are not even mentioned.[2] Moreover, the procedural rules given in the accord are of such a kind as to give Israel a de facto veto on all essential points in any future process. The 1973 defeat of Egypt was trans- formed into collusion in defeating further those lower down.

In other words, neither an image of peace, nor any peace process if for no other reason simply because of the non-recogni- tion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Instead of a peace process there has been a war process, with the concomitants of war such as occupation of Palestine territory, with harrassment/ repression, censorship, controll of all other kinds of political ex-

pression, ransacking, arrests, expulsion, Palestinians defending
themselves through acts of destructiveness and terrorism, re-
prisals--in short the full panoply of the evils of occupation
as known, for instance, to a Norwegian like the author from the German
Occupation of Norway 1940-1945. That occupation was a relatively
mild one if I do not take into account the specific Nazi content
of the occupation of Norway, leading to the extermination of more
than half of Norway's 1,800 Jews. On the other hand there was no
German plan to expel the Norwegian population into a neighboring
country such as Sweden, reserving Norwegian territory for them-
selves, alone, either.

But then there are the two subsidiary conflicts in the area
between Israel and the Arab/Moslem states, and between the super-
powers, and the United Nations. For the conflict between Israel
and the Arab/Moslem states there has been at least a scenario for
a "peace process". The image of peace is traditional, which in
itself is no objection: inter-state relations regulated by inter-
national law in general, and specific (peace) treaties in particular.
There was also the idea of a process, peace by pieces, dealing
with one Arab/Moslem state at the time. Egypt was to serve as the
model for all of them, turning defeat (1973) into reconciliation,
with Sadat's travel to Jerusalem 1977 as paradigmatic, ending
with a treaty (Camp David) as the model for all of them. Next in
line were Jordan, and Lebanon, providing a setting for the more re-
calcitrant Syria and Iraq to follow suit, and ultimately the whole

Arab world regardless of how distant from the core area. The
problem was, of course, that any Arab/Moslem leader engaging in
this process would be doomed to live in perennial fear of his own
people and by the time the "peace process" had reached Arab/
Moslem country N the process would have already backfired if not
in N-1 or N-2 at least in number N-3 and N-4. However
this may be, the entire "peace process" died in Sabra-Chatila
1982 in the eyes of so much of the world seeing Israel as having
sunk to the level of the oppressors, condoning a genocidal type of
action.

Then there are the subsidiary conflicts involving the super-
powers in the area. I think it is fair to say that there are two
types of conflicts at stake here. One is traditional super-power
interference and intervention in what they see as their "interests".
They invoke an age-old theory to make a wrong look like a right:
the sphere of interests. bolstering it with an even older theory
that makes two wrongs look even more right, "if he has a sphere
of interest in this area I am also entitled to one". There is an
image of peace in this connection: the United States has Israel
in her sphere of interest; the Soviet Union has Syria in hers
with all this implies in terms of rights and duties on either side.
As to the process any reading of the history of the last 40 years
or so in the area would be sufficient. How stable may be argued;
but an image there is.

But then there is that second conflict which has to do with
conflict management. That there is a conflict in the area is
certainly not to be doubted. But this is a peculiar conflict;
a conflict not between right and wrong, nor between wrong and
wrong, but between right and right--both Jews and Arabs in the core
area having a right to settle--which makes it even more intract-
able. A conflict of that type calls for its manager. Whoever is
able to manage the conflict successfully would be greeted with
considerable gratitude not only from the inhabitants but also
from a world desperately short of miracles. The key competitors
as conflict managers are the United States (Camp David) and the
United Nations (Security Council Resolutions Number 242 and 338).
But if these two are front runners the Soviet Union cannot afford
to be far behind, and one major factor holding up any process in
the area is the refusal to give to the Soviet Union a meaningful
role as participant in the conflict management process.

In this particular conflict there is also a possible peace
image: a management directorate of the super-powers operating
within a framework set by the United Nations. And for the
process there is the machinery, slow but well-defined, of the
United Nations. One point about that machinery, however, is
that there is no guarantee that it will deliver an outcome
totally satisfactory to either super-power and for that reason
the stronger of them will certainly tend to try to do without.

Conclusion: in the periphery of the extremely complex and intractable conflict formation in the area there are both images of peace and processes; in the core neither one nor the other. Just to the countrary: what is enacted in the area is not a peace process, nor exactly a war process, except for certain periods at certain places, but the traditional way of clearing a territory for own use--disturbingly similar to what Americans have done to native Americans since the founding of the Plymouth Colony in Massachusetts Bay. There is a combination of extermination, expulsion to other countries as refugees, internal expulsion in reservations, and the conversion of human beings into second-class citizens politically, economically, culturally and/or militarily. Of course, there is also the fifth possibility of transformation into first-class citizens but in a Jewish state with clearly theocratic features this would demand a conversion in so many senses as to be unacceptable.

Of course, we are not quite in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: there is less focus on extermination, more on external and internal expulsion. Moreover, Palestinians in the core area render themselves more willingly to the plight of the second-class citizen than native Americans have done, maybe they prefer expulsion to the internal reservation to very marginal participation in the American social structure. But the general philosophy of the Chosen People with a Promised Land on the one hand and those who "just happen" to live there, in what was defined as a sparsely populated territory on the other, is disturbingly similar. A travesty of any idea of peace.

2.   An Alternative Peace Process: An Image

For a peace process to take place there has to be one or
several images of peace, in other words some kind of goal or
goals, and some idea of a process--possibly even some mutually
agreed indicators of whether the process is roughly, speaking.
heading in the right direction or not.   The crucial point here
is probably the image of the goal; if that image gains some kind
of acceptance a process can possibly be devised.

There are three rival images of some importance in this
connection, there being a general consensus that the present
state of affairs is intolerable to Israelis and Palestinians, to
Jews and Arabs alike--although the intolerable has now lasted
for quite some time.   The three images are: a one-state solution
with the absorption of the Palestinians as first class citizens
within Israel, a two-state solution with the creation of an inde-
pendent Palestinian state anchored in the West Bank and Gaza and
a confederate solution based on some kind of Israeli/Palestinian
partnership.   The present author does not believe in the first,
have grave doubts about the second, but some faith in the third
alternative.   Thus, I fail to see how the whole idea of a Jewish
national home, Judaism being a religion, is compatible with first
class citizenship for non-Jews, however much this may be enshrined
in some bill of rights.   If Jews, Christians and Moslems in the
area could reconcile their differences by joint allegiance to an

overarching system of belief, such as The Baha'i faith, then
something might perhaps be worked out. But the proposition is
absurd given the nature of the myth underlying the creation of
the state of Israel, not to mention the unspeakable realities of
the holocaust perpetrated by a Christian nation on the Jews of
Europe.

A Palestinian nation-state based on pre-1967 conditions
might make more sense within the ancient code of nation-state
building: one country per nation, all members of that nation inside
that country, the construction of a state organization within that
country controlled by members of that nation. But the three
objections are equally obvious: Palestinians have a rightful
claim to access to territories within the pre-1967 borders of
Israel; the territorial polarization in the two-state solution
is a way of stripping for violent action; and in addition to that,
finally, the territories are so small that economic viability
certainly can be doubted. To this some might object that Jordan
is viable, the majority is already Palestinian so why not "put"
the rest of the Palestinians there by driving them out of the
West Bank/Gaza which can then be settled by Jews? Needless to
say, any such social expansion as a follow-up of the 1967
territorial expansion only makes bad things even worse, driving
the Palestinians even further away from their rightful homeland.

The confederate solution would have as its point of departure the core area, mandated Palestine, possibly accepting the River Jordan as the eastern border for Jewish settlement. The territory west of that river would then have Israeli and Palestinian cantons, possibly even exchanging some Israeli settlements on the West Bank for Palestinian settlements (Nazareth?) within pre-1967 Israel. Jerusalem would be the federal district in this configuration, open to all, ruled by them in conjunction, not by one or the other or others.

Needless to say, formulations such as these are satisfactory to no one who believes in the sanctity of pure nation-states. Put differently: it would only be satisfactory to those who, like the Swiss, believe in a certain linguistic and religious conti- guity and purity but at the same time also can think in over- arching terms, composing an identity as Swiss. The latter would take a long time to develop in this particular area. The set of Jewish cantons would think of themselves as Israel for a very long time to come, and the set of Palestinian cantons would think of themselves as Palestine, correspondingly. But through a process of mutual conditioning, in as equitable a manner as possible with no one being secondary citizens to the other, or expelled by the other, an overarching identity might sooner or later emerge. Consequently, these are images that could be satisfactory to moderates in either camp, and there are many of them, perhaps percentage wise higher on the Palestinian than on the Israeli side as there is some ambiguity as to where the Peace

Now forces are located politically (when they say peace, does that mean continuation of status quo with no belligerent adventures such as Lebanon 1982?--Continuation of the suppression of the Palestinians with no basic change in either direction?--A two-state solution?--A one-state solution?).

For a fruitful discussion to emerge between the moderates of either side the two basic problems of geographical borders and institutional arrangements would have to be addressed, directly. For this to happen not only one but several maps should be produced; not only one but several institutional arrangements for a confederation should be elaborated. Time would be needed for this to be discussed and processed, years, years. A confederation presupposes some limitation on Palestinian and Israeli sovereignty; from, but not including, 0% (the two-state solution) to 100% limitation of one but not the other (the one-state solution, with the other side integrated as first or second class citizens, or expelled, including those haunting political cliches of the "Jews into the sea" and the "Arabs into the desert"). Although these extreme positions are to be avoided any realistic image should be dynamic, starting, for instance, with images of a two-state solution with the process of gradual integration/fusion so as to come closer to a viable confederation. The presence and possible inclusion of Jordan in the area (in the present paper in the "core area") has led to some thinking in the direction of Be-Ne-Lux, possibly with Jordan as Belgium, The Netherlands as Israel and Palestine as Luxembourg, not pressing the analogy too far. This way of thinking is different from the Swiss model indicated above,

but not incompatible if a more dynamic perspective on confederation formation is adopted.

So much for the image, what about the process?

In one sense the process has already started. All over the world, but perhaps particularly in the United States of America Jews and Arabs, Israelis and Palestinians of less purist persuasions[3] are meeting in small groups with or without third parties, discussing the core conflict. I think only very few of these discussions are ever centered on the confederate solution, which does not mean that such correlated images cannot be brought into the picture in the future. There is a people's diplomacy going on in this field of considerable proportions, a natural concomitant of the near total breakdown or meaningful discussions at the top level, meaning between Israeli governmental parties and the PLO (it will be remembered that I am not talking here about the subsidiary conflicts, in those fields quite a lot of secret contact exists). Familiarity with the idea of an image of a peaceful future in geographical and institutional terms, even with some concrete details, would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for further progress.

Further progress can only take place if both parties recognize the right of the other to exist, in the sense of the right to a homeland in the core area, including west of Jordan. But this is not the same as the recognition of the right of an

Israeli state or a Palestinian state to exist; as is well known

these are exactly the rights that neither side might like to

guarantee to the other. A confederate solution would obviate that

problem by opting for a softer definition of "homeland". As a

matter of fact, in general insistence on pre-conditions for talks

is a signal that no talks are really wanted, since such pre-

conditions tend to focus on the most, not the least sticky issues.

Talks, presumably, are about the intractable, not about the

immediately feasible--hence, no preconditions.

Either side will have to accept, however, that the other side

decides who are their representatives in serious negotiations.

The Jews, having had the privilege of building a nation-state

with the usual executive organs will have the traditional

machinery of such states to build on, such as the government

in general and the ministry of foreign affairs in particular.

The Arabs, not having a corresponding construction in the form

of a Palestinian state (and for that reason possibly being

hesitant and reluctant to engage in the peace process unless more

symmetry is established by being   closer to a West Bank/Gaza

formation)   will have to rely on their organization.   This

means the PLO, which seems to enjoy considerable support among

Palestinians, whether Israel likes this or not.[4] Any reference

to Palestinian terrorist tactics by a state like Israel, certainly

based on terrorism itself is deeply inappropriate, a point that

should be understood by the Israeli side. And these are the two

parties to the discussions, ideally in need of nobody else. The

future of both of them depends on their ability to meet, alone.

But there are subsidiary conflicts that also will have to
be dealt with, and any Israeli/Palestinian solution will have to
be acceptable to other actors on the scene. Hence a two-tiered
or three-tiered process could be envisaged: one for a core con-
flict involving only Israelis and Palestinians; one for the
subsidiary conflicts involving all other Arab/Moslem states in
the area; and one involving the super-powers, partly with, partly
without the United Nations. An overarching conference for the
whole area has been discussed for a long period and might be use-
ful. In that case it should take place under the aegis of the
United Nations, possibly with the two super-powers as co-presi-
dents (But preferably with no such arrangement, the important
point being that if one of them is present so should the other). The
process is then open to other parties represented in the way they
deem appropriate. In other words, a recognition of PLO and the
Soviet Union as discussion/negotiation partners is an absolutely
necessary condition, and the latter should be easier as the
Soviet Union comes closer to the opening of diplomatic relations
with Israel. The UN on the other hand might consider opening a
new office or agency to serve as a setting in which this important
process not only for peace in the area but also for peace in the
world might take place.

The terms of reference for a process would be individual
human rights and rights of peoples, rather than rights of states.
It is the right of the Jewish people to settle in (some parts of)

their holy land. But also to be recognized is the right of
Palestinian Arabs to settle in (some parts of) their homeland. All
of these are rights of peoples, not rights of states. The
appropriate institutional arrangement should flow from rights of
individuals and peoples, rather than being built into the process
from the beginning as all peoples' inalienable right to have a
state. The question should always be asked: are we that
convinced that the construction of the modern state, with its
concomitants in terms of the right of the state to wage wars and
to have unlimited internal jurisdiction is such an unmitigated success?

As mentioned above several maps, not only one, and
several institutional arrangements, not only one, should be pro-
duced to have a variety of images and processes, leaving to the
participants in the process to limit the range. This would
certainly include mechanisms for review. There would be ideas about
how to weaken a confederation towards separate state formation
if that nevertheless should be a better solution. And about how to
strengthen it, reducing the autonomy of more sovereign actors.
Flexibility, not rigidity would be the basic formula.

It is important to note that historically Moslems have been
considerably more hospitable to Christians and to Jews than
Christians have been to Moslems and Jews and Jews have been to
either--but then it may also be said that historically Jews have
not been given much of a chance. Today enmity between Jews and
Moslems is the rule, but that is not a lasting condition. It is
strong enough, in my view, to make a one state secular
solution with Jews and Moslems (and some Christians) living side-

by-side rather unlikely, but not strong engouth to make it impossible for cantons to live side-by-side under some overarching administrative, jointly run, umbrella.

So, I conclude so far in favor of the confederate solution as a peace image. The one state solution is incompatible with the principle of symmetry between Jews and Arabs, Israeli and Palestinians, as born out of the principle of a conflict between two rights, the inalienable <u>rights</u> of two peoples. The two states solution is on the surface compatible, but denies Palestinians access to much of their land, gives them too little--and is too dangerous. The confederate solution gives access, keeps them apart, yet weaves them together in an equitable manner <u>as they must be</u>--given how tightly they are woven together historically and geographically.

3. Conclusion: Some Trends to Consider.

Today, twenty years after the 1967 War, the prospects for
peace in the area are certainly very far from good. More
particularly, Israel and the United States look so strong and
united; Palestinians and the Arab states so weak and disunited.
On top of it all: the Iraq-Iran conflict. So let me indicate
some processes, some strong, some weak, some hardly to be dis-
puted, others highly controversial that in the course of time,
and I am thinking here of periods not more then five to ten years,
may change the picture considerably. in favor of a peaceful solution.

First of all, there is the moral degradation of Israel
symbolized by Sabra-Chatila.   This moral degradation is
confirmed almost every day in the suppression of human rights in
the occuppied territories. This is extremely important to Israel
as its political power in the past has been moral power, more
particularly the shame power that Israel as exponent of the Jewish
people has used, successfully and to a large extent rightly so,
particularly in Europe The USA is in a different situation.
being the place in the world that has opened itself (and for that
the US deserves the gratitude not only of the Jewish people but of
the world as a whole) as   a home where Jews can be Jews, and
Christians and many others can be themselves. Europe was never
that generous.   As moral power declines the power of the carrot
(economic power) and the power of the stick (military power) will
have to increase and it is limited to how much sympathy Israel can

buy and how much terror she can instill in a numerically far
superior nation. There are also limits to US support.

Second, Israel is an increasingly divided country. There
is no need here to review internal divisions and the general move
of Israel towards the right, towards the self-righteous/national-
ist/orthodox. But that move will incresingly be accompanied by
counter-moves, so brilliantly put forward and analyzed by the
former head of Israeli intelligence, Harkabi in his various
writings.[5] There will increasingly be groups in Israel impatient
with the current impasse, demanding more radical solutions such
as the expulsion of Palestinians into Jordan and the transforma-
tion of the conflict into an inter-state conflict that can be
treated in a more conventional manner, using the military as
military and not as police troops. But there will also be the
opposite demands, beyond Peace Now--created by the dialectic of the
process.

Third, I do not think the US-Israel alliance can remain as
unbreakable as it looks today. There are limits to the extent to which
a   tail can successfully wag a dog. The recent spy case[6] is
less important than what I sense as an increasing irritation in
the US at the degree to which the US position in a vast area of
the world is dictated by Israeli logic. This will put limits on
Israeli behavior. Those limits are likely to be over-stepped by
the more intransigent forces inside Israel, and ruptures may
appear particularly if the US should get an administration less
subservient to a numerically very small minority inside its own
borders, regardless of how strong that minority is as intelligent-

sia and managers of US foreign policy debate in general, and in
connection with Israel in particular.

Fourth, on the other hand: there seems to be a Palestinian
awakening.   To be occuppied without any prospect of near term
acceptable solution is horrible to any people.   Of course there is
the temptation to accept the condition and make the best of it,
particularly in economic terms, going shopping in Tel Aviv, till-
ing the soil for Israeli masters.   But the reactions, violent and
non-violent[7], seem to be more numerous for every day.   Important
in this connection would be the ability of the Palestinians in the
diaspora to organize as well as the Jews in the diaspora have
been able to do.

Fifth, there is, indeed, a new Islam coming. Fundamentalist,
dialectically created among other reasons by the pressures from
Christian nations and the Jewish nation in their midst, Israel.
If the Christians are able to go out everywhere and make all
peoples their disciples, if not necessarily in the religious sense
at least economically, militarily, and politically and the Jews
are able to fulfill their religious dream, Eretz Israel, why should
not the Moslems also be fundamentalists capable of realizing some
of their dreams? And why should this be limited to shia Islam?
Why should a corresponding mode ` not also come to sunni Islam,
not in the sense of the sunnis becoming shias as is the typical
uni-centric model so frequently found in the US--always looking for
a "Center of Evil" and never able to see themselves as a part of

the problem, indeed the cause--why should there not also be a
genuine sunni fundamentalism? It might take other forms, might
even be opposed to the shia version, but an awakening there could
be and probably will be.

Sixth, there is probably a growing pan-Arabism. An institu-
tion like the Arab Thought Forum[8] would hardly have been possible some
years ago. Many people in many Arab countries are well off,
dedicated to Arabism as a cause, in religious and/or secular terms.
A proposition not very popular with Egyptians: maybe the fact
that Egypt has been dethroned or has dethroned itself by partici-
pating in the infamous "peace process" has contributed to the
pan-Arabic cause! Maybe Egypt loomed so high, was so dominating
because of its geographical position, its age as a viable relatively
autonomous nation-state, indeed as one of the first, rich, power-
ful, demobilized other Arab states that now, separately and in-
creasingly combined, will have to take up the cause and carry it
further? Egypt will sooner or later be reintegrated into the Arab
fold, but will never quite be able to rid itself of the suspicion
of being pharaonic first and Arab second, with all that implies in
terms of separateness--in an unequal manner.

Seventh, and overarching all of this: there is some kind of
US-Soviet appeasement going on. There is a glasnost in the Soviet
Union, so far none in the United States. But it may come. The
current administration and its atmosphere of extreme self-
righteousness cannot last forever. But this is accompanied by one

dangerous sign on the horizon: the US always seems to need an evil and
powerful enemy.   But who can be the successor to the Soviet Union?   Who
would be more ideally suited than "Moslem Terrorism", religiously ade-
quate, politically sufficiently menacing?   And if that is the case there
might be even less likelihood of the US agreeing to the rights of the
Palestinian people in any form--unless, that is, that they, the Pales-
tinians, are somehow seen as separate or separable from "Moslem Terror-
ism" in general.   Or, unless a wave of rationality should sweep over
the American mainland and wipe away some of the paranoia pestering the US.

It is up to anybody to make projections and predictions.   But there is
a dynamism that was absent for some years, and my general contention would
be that it is not favoring the type of ironclad rule associated with an
Israeli politician like Sharon.   It may actually not play into the hands
of Palestinian terrorist tactics either.   Sharon and most terrorists need
each other for mutual survival.   Maybe this is increasingly seen by more
moderate forces in either camp, and by moderate I would tend to mean
"people in general".   So, maybe nevertheless there is a hope that some-
thing might start moving in a more positive direction.

Undoubtedly, the reader of this paper will have come to the same
conclusion as the present author: a confederate solution is extremely
problematic.   But the reader may also come to the second conclusion
drawn by the present author;   that any other solution is even more prob-
lematic, in the sense of being worse in human terms and for that reason
less viable.[9]

N   O   T   E   S

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[1] In other words, this process has been going on for the
better part of this century and can by no means be seen as
a post-holocaust policy only. The Palestinian resistance
has also been going on for the better part of the century.

[2] See Fayez A. Sayegh, Senior Consultant, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Kuwait, **Camp David and Palestine,**
A Preliminary Analysis, New York, October 1978, for a good
analysis from a moderate Arab point of view.

[3] An example is actually the very conference in which this
paper was presented, with all kinds of small dialogues going
on in many different settings, formal and informal.

[4] For an example see Sammy Smooha and Don Peretz, "The
Arabs in Israel", **Journal of Conflict Resolution,** September
1982 for a survey reporting 64.3% supporting a Palestinian
state in West Bank/Gaza, 20% only under certain
circumstances, and 15.7% opposed; 68% approved PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people, 22.9% accepted PLO
with reservations and 9.1% rejected it entirely. According to
the survey undertaken 28 July to 8 August 1986 93.5% sees
PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people, with 78.8% endorsing Arafat as the Palestinian
leader (**Klassekampen,** Oslo, 19 March 1987, p. 12).

[5] A general/director of intelligence turned professor of
international relations, but a hawk turned dove? Harkabi
denies this: "My country has moved so far to the right that
by standing still I come out at the left" (in a discussion,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, January 1986).

[6] Spring 1987, The Pollard Case.

[7] See, for instance, Deena Hurwitz, "Nonviolence in the
Occupied Territories", **I&P,** July 1986, pp. 22f.

[8] ATF organized a very succesful conference on nonviolence
in the Middle East in Amman, Jordan, November 1986.

[9] For my own exploration of the theme of confederation in
the Middle East, see "The Middle East and the Theory of
Conflict, **Essays in Peace Research,** Vol. V, Ejlers,
Copenhagen, 1980, ch. 3